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A JEFFERSONIAN CHALLENGE
FROM TENNESSEE: THE NOTORIOUS CASE OF THE
ENDANGERED "SNAIL DARTER" VERSUS TVA'S
TELLICO DAM-AND WHERE WAS
THE FOURTH ESTATE, THE PRESS?
ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER*
I. INTRODUCTION
For most if not all public interest issues in contemporary governance
debates, there are in effect four branches of government, not three. For
better or worse, the modem media constitute the essential public
information source playing a determinative role in the intensely political
internal processes of modem government at every level. To ignore the
fundamental reality of this Fourth Estate' is not to fully understand modem
civics and is to risk repeated shortfalls for citizen initiatives attempting to
advance public welfare. In no other field is this proposition more evident
than in the realm of governmental protection of environmental resources
and values.
This essay seeks to draw useful analysis and perceptions about the
modem media's systemic impact upon national governance, using a highly
charged, true-life parable from Tennessee, examined in the hindsight of
over thirty years. A national environmental saga that arose from Tennessee
more than three decades ago-when a group of citizens persuaded the U.S.
Supreme Court to block completion of the Tennessee Valley Authority's
final dam project because it endangered a tiny "snail darter" perch-
intensely reflected the decisive role played by the acts and omissions of
local and national media.
* Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. A.B. Princeton, 1965; JD. Yale,
1968; S.J.D. Michigan, 1982. I was honored and delighted that the University of Tennessee
College of Law and the Howard H. Baker, Jr. Center for Public Policy were able to present
such an engaging and thought-provoking Symposium focused on the legal and media battles
over the Little Tennessee River. My gratitude and admiration are extended to the students,
faculty, and staff who created and implemented the symposium so well.
1. Edmund Burke may have coined the name of "Fourth Estate" for the press,
acknowledging its potent role in government. In Europe the accepted participants in post-
feudal realms were often classed in three estates-in France, the clergy, the nobility, and the
haute bourgeoisie; in England the Lords Spiritual, Lords Temporal, and House of Commons.
In 1787, noting the presence of reporters allowed to observe proceedings in Parliament,
Burke is supposed to have said, "There are Three Estates in Parliament, but, in the
Reporters' Gallery yonder there sits a Fourth Estate, more important far than they all" (as
quoted in Thomas Carlyle's book, HEROS AND HERO WORSHIP IN HISTORY (1841)).
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"Little fish bites dam"-that basic media caricature immediately and
predictably grabbed wide, raucous, public attention when the diminutive
snail darter halted TVA's Tellico Dam Project. But there was far more to
the story, with serious public interests at risk waiting to be developed and
reported as the case moved through the channels of government. The
agency's dam project contained very dubious economic justifications,
questionable condemnations of private farmlands for corporate resale,
destruction of extraordinary natural and economic resources, and the
availability of extraordinarily valuable development alternatives without a
dam. Yet despite voluminous ink and air time lavished on the fish-versus-
dam story (one of the decade's three most-covered environmental stories),2
from beginning to end the media fundamentally failed to discern and report
the dramatic realities behind the caricature, and that failure ultimately
permitted a tragic miscarriage of the public interest.
Tracking the complex narrative of the Tellico Dam case and its parallel
caricature in media and politics, this analysis explores the case as a
paradigm and parable for assessing how and why the media performs its
role impacting the law as it does.3
2. The darter versus dam story, according to Professor Ronald Rollet, an
environmental journalism specialist at the University of Michigan School of Natural
Resources, was one of the three most-covered environmental stories in the press of that
decade-as recounted to the author by Dr. Rollet, the other two issues were the Love Canal
toxics case and the Alaska Lands Act controversy.
3. The author and his students in Tennessee and Michigan, with help from many
others noted here and in the book noted last below, served as petitioner and attorney in the
case, carrying it from its start in old Fort Loudon on its bluff above the Little Tennessee
River, up through federal agencies, three Congresses, the Supreme Court, the first-ever
congressionally-mandated inquiry in the so-called "God Committee" or "God Squad," and
extensive efforts with the press. This essay is thus written from the perspective of an avowed
advocate, but as an academic, the author is also constrained by a responsibility of fairness to
opposing arguments. It is impossible, of course, to remove one's personal reactions to a
dramatic case through which one has lived. On the objective historical record, however,
most of the facts of this particular case were ultimately determined to be extremely one-
sided. In a wide range of areas, as the 1979 God Committee ultimately concluded, the actual
merits of the Authority's case for the dam project were slim to none. Seen in retrospect, the
citizens' arguments and alternative plans from the start were overwhelmingly more accurate
and positive for the affirmative interests of the public and the environment.
The history of the snail darter case is reflected in several books, which interested readers are
encouraged to explore. See WILLIAM BRUCE WHEELER & MICHAEL J. MCDONALD, TVA AND
THE TELLICO DAM, 1936-1979: A BLREAUCRATIC CRISIS IN POST-INDUSTRIAL AMERICA
(Univ. of Tenn. Press, 1986) (hereinafter WHEELER & MCDONALD); MICHAEL R.
FITZGERALD & STEPHEN J. RECHICHAR, THE CONSEQUENCES OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION:
TVA's ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT MISSION AND INTRAGOVERNMENT REGULATION (Univ. of
Tenn. Press, 1983); see also WILLIAM U. CHANDLER, THE MYTH OF TVA (Ballinger, 1984)
(examining differential economic development in the region); J. THOMPSON & C. BROOKS,
TELLICO DAM AND THE SNAIL DARTER (Spectrum, 1991) (presenting the TVA arguments in a
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II. JEFFERSON, MADISON, AND THE ELEMENTAL ROLE OF THE PRESS IN A
DEMOCRACY
Thomas Jefferson framed the critical role that journalism must play in a
democratic society, providing essential information to the American public
so that citizens can hold their government to its high calling. Deeming "the
good sense of the people.. .the only safeguard of the public liberty,"
Jefferson counseled that "if we think them not enlightened enough to
exercise their control with a wholesome discretion, the remedy is not to
take it from them, but to inform their discretion."
And how was the public to be informed, in Jefferson's ideal?
Give them full information of their affairs thro' the channel of the
public papers, and... contrive that those papers should penetrate the whole
mass of the people .... Were it left to me to decide whether we should
have a government without newspapers, or newspapers without a
government, I should not hesitate a moment to prefer the latter.4
As Madison added, "A popular government, without popular
information or the means of acquiring it, is but a prologue to a farce or a
tragedy, or perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern ignorance: And a
people who mean to be their own Governors, must arm themselves with the
power which knowledge gives."'
complimentary light); FRANCES BROWN DORWARD, DAM GREED (Xlibris, 2009) (presenting a
local history of the Little Tennessee River valley and Tellico Dam based upon many oral
history interviews); KENNETH M. MURCHISON, THE SNAIL DARTER CASE: TVA VERSUS THE
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT (Univ. of Kansas Press, 2007) (including excellent and
exhaustive accounting of twenty-five years of legal proceedings in the agencies, Congress,
and courts, based on extensive reviews of published official legal records). Some of the
author's earlier thoughts on the subject of media can be found in Law and the Fourth Estate:
Endangered Nature, the Press, and the Dicey Game of Democratic Governance, 32 ENVTL.
LAW 1 (2002); and Law, Media, & Environmental Policy: A Fundamental Linkage in
Sustainable Democratic Governance, 33 B. C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 511 (2006). And recently
appearing from the author is THE SNAIL DARTER AND THE DAM-How PORK-BARREL
POLITICS ENDANGERED A LITTLE FISH AND KILLED A RIVER (Yale Univ. Press, 2013)
(hereinafter SNAIL DARTER & THE DAM). Portions of this essay draw directly from that text.
A substantial archive of further materials is also available at the book's website, see Digital
Commons, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW SCHOOL, www.bc.edu/snaildarter (last visited May 29,
2013).
4. Thomas Jefferson to Edward Carrington, 1787, quoted in JOHN NICHOLS &
ROBERT MCCHESNEY, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF AMERICAN JOURNALISM: THE MEDIA
REVOLUTION THAT WILL BEGIN THE WORLD AGAIN 119 (Nation, 2011).
5. James Madison to W. T. Barry, 1822, quoted in RALPH LOUIS
KETCHAM, SELECTED WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 308 (Hackett, 2006); Thomas Jefferson
to William C. Jarvis, 1820, quoted in ROGER OSBORNE, CIVILIZATION: A NEW HISTORY OF
THE WESTERN WORLD 324 (Pegasus, 2006).
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As in the nation's early years, the press continues to provide the daily
flow of facts and opinion that reaches the American public's eyes and ears.
When a situation is well covered by the media, Congress knows it is on the
radar of public opinion and tends to address it on the merits. If it is not, all
too often what governs is business-as-usual, tribalistic, off-the-radar insider
capitol politics.
Over past decades the active engagement, or absence, of thoughtful
journalistic inquiry has repeatedly determined how well governmental
decision-making and Establishment-pressured politics have served the
public welfare. Watergate and the WMD-driven invasion of Iraq are polar
opposites, where the press 6 forced open a public window upon the core
facts of a significant public controversy, or didn't.
The essential role of the press in informing the public is repeatedly
relevant throughout modem national affairs-in the areas of civil rights,
communication, securities and banking, industrial production, labor, foreign
relations, transportation, health care, large and small business, large and
small agriculture, mining and other resource exploitation, emergency
preparedness, information technology, patterns of wealth and poverty, and
much more.
A core reality in the public importance of the media is that within the
internal dynamics of the political process the official players generally are
well aware of the public-interest facts but-absent public awareness-make
decisions based upon the very different calculus of capitol politics. Daily
political life is dominated by the internal institutional dynamics of
legislatures and a sea of lobbying pressures, alliances, campaign finance
contributions and other seductive blandishments coming from the
established special interest "iron triangles"7 of capitol politics. When a
6. In this essay the words "press" and "media" are used interchangeably, although it
should be noted that "media" currently often connotes a broader range of communication.
"Media" today includes the vast sea of political public relations information created and
proliferated by market players to project their agendas and point of view into the political
process. Further, in this essay, "media" is often but not always singular, despite the word's
proper Latin plurality, in order to fit the ears of spoken English diction.
7. "Iron triangles," in modem political science lexicon, are the working alliances that
dominate many of the most important administrative and legislative processes in modem
government-interlocking triads of specialized economic interests (like mining, timber,
military equipment, highway construction, water projects, guns, and dozens more), and the
legislators and administrative agencies with which they interlock. See FRANCIS E. ROURKE,
BUREAUCRACY, POLITICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (HarperCollins 3d ed. 1984). Often working
together, they constitute the world of political "insiders"--the political Establishment that
shapes the daily reality of government actions at federal and state levels. Because they are
typically mobilized to secure special individualized advantages from the existing pattern of
laws and economics, they tend to be regressive, counterpoised against the public interest as a
whole, often resembling the "extractive dlites." See D. ACEMOGLU & J. ROBINSON, WHY
NATIONS FAIL (2012) (explaining that such parties ride their own narrowed special interests
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vivid event like a disaster, or the first Earth Day, thrusts essential facts and
problems of governance issues into public consciousness, however, the
political process often is forced to debate and decide matters based upon the
actual public merits rather than insider dynamics . . . as long as public
attention continues to focus upon the issue.
In the environmental realm, such active media coverage has played a
decisive role in virtually every area. When the press has reacted vividly and
with tenacity to a public problem-including the Love Canal toxic
contamination, the Kepone pesticide contamination, the Exxon-Valdez oil
spill, the Reagan Administration's proposal to sell off certain national
parks, the "Bridge to Nowhere," and the Bush Administration's proposal to
allow trading in toxic mercury air pollution creditss -the iron triangles are
weakened and protective law is applied. These cases are prime
contemporary examples of the press's active Jeffersonian function of
raising the public's civic awareness of facts that otherwise might have been
masked by official opacity.
When the press is absent or impersistent on an issue, failing to
understand or note significant irrationalities in iron triangle projects or
programs, the insider game can roll on unhindered by any likelihood of
corrective public pressure from informed voters. 9 Examples include the
failure to note the unstable mortgage derivative balloon created by
unregulated financial manipulations of the securities markets prior to 2008,
the uncritical acceptance of the existence of nuclear threat in Iraq, the
wasteful and destructive construction of the Army Corps of Engineers'
in profit and power, controlling and manipulating the status quo to the long term detriment
of their societies).
8. Covered heavily by the media, the Love Canal residential contamination and the
Allied Chemical Kepone incident on the James River and Chesapeake Bay led to
congressional strengthening of the toxic and water quality statutes. See ADELINE G. LEVINE,
LOVE CANAL: SCIENCE, POLITICS AND PEOPLE (1982); PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
& POLICY 38-52 (4th ed. 2009); Seven Years in Iraq: An Iraq Timeline, TIME MAGAZINE,
http://www.time.com/time/specials/packages/0,28757,1967340,00.html (last visited May 29,
2013); Iraq War in Quotes, ZFACTS, http://zfacts.com/iraq-war-quotes (last visited May 29,
2013); GEOFFREY SMITH, THE TENNESSEE-TOMBIGBEE WATERWAY: A CRITCAL STUDY
(1991) (Thesis, 5-1991, TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange). After the
1989 Exxon-Valdez spill, the public's media-driven awareness of the disaster led to actual
legislative response, the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, which, though subsequently somewhat
eroded, made several improvements in oil industry management. Pub. L. No. 101-380, 104
Stat. 484 (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-3207 (2006)).
9. The information that is presented by the news media tends to define the outward
boundaries of what is subjected to conversation and debate within the electorate. In many
environmental cases public awareness doesn't include a realization that further significant
information may exist and be missing from the debate; active public demand for further facts
that are not being reported is quite rare. See W. LANCE BENNETT, NEWS: THE POLITICS OF
ILLUSION 216 (2001).
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"Mister GO" shipping channel at New Orleans, the Corps' $4 billion
Tennessee-Tombigbee scheme literally moving mountains to create a
useless channel in Alabama to parallel the Mississippi, and dozens more. °
In these cases, the lassitude of the press illustrated, by omission, the
importance of the media's Jeffersonian role, and harmful public
consequences followed media failures to report ongoing official mistakes.
As the 2009 Knight Commission noted, the press's role is to sustain a
national "informed community" where the public gains news and
information "to participate in our system of self-government, [where the
media sustains] the critical democratic values of openness, inclusion,
participation, empowerment, and the common pursuit of truth and the
public interest"--paradigmatic modem Jeffersonianism."
10. The Army Corps of Engineers' "Mississippi River Gulf Outlet" (MRGO)
shipping channel destroyed the protective barrier islands south of New Orleans, channeled
the Katrina and Rita hurricane flood forces directly into the heart of the city, and has never
been substantially used by ships. See R. VERChiCK, FACING CATASTROPHE: ENVIRONMENTAL
ACTION FOR A POST-KATRINA WORLD (2010). Disasters don't always succeed in countering
the inside players. After the BP Deepwater Horizon blowout, BP deployed a masterful
political and media campaign to minimize public awareness of the agency-corporate actions
that had led to the calamity, and of the true short and long term consequences of the oil and
dispersants released into the coastal communities and environment. See THOMAS BERGIN,
SPILLS AND SPIN: THE INSIDE STORY OF BP (2012).
BP in fact had borne a primary responsibility for causing the Exxon-Valdez spill. See Noaki
Schwartz, BP Had a Key Role in the Exxon Valdez Disaster, AssoC. PRESS (May 25, 2010),
http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2010/may/25/bp-had-a-key-role-in-the-exxon-vadez-
disaster/._At the time of the Exxon Valdez spill, BP had a 50.01% controlling interest within
the seven-corporation Alyeska consortium, which meant that the Alyeska consortium's
operational decisions, much criticized by the Alaska Commission report, were driven by
BP's majority position. See also Plater, The Exxon Valdez Re-Surfaces in the Gulf of Mexico,
38 B. C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 391, 398, n.28 (2011). BP learned and successfully applied
major lessons in press and public opinion management from the Exxon-Valdez event,
substantially undercutting public awareness of the serious lingering harms from the BP
Deepwater Horizon blowout. See also Jeremy W. Peters, Efforts to Limit the Flow of Spill
News, NEW YORK TIMES (Jun. 9, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/10/us
/l0access.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0-; Lenon Honor, Media Mind Control and the BP Oil
Spill in the Gulf of Mexico, LENON HONOR FILMS, http://www.lenonhonorfilms.com/
BPoilspillinthegulfofnexicoPartl.html (last visited May 29, 2013).
11. The Knight Commission on the Information Needs of Communities in a
Democracy, Report: Informing Communities: Sustaining Democracy in the Digital Age, at xi
(2009), available at http://www.knightcomm.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/02/Informing_
CommunitiesSustainingDemocracyin the Digital Age.pdf.
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III. THE TVA TELLICO PROJECT AND THE ENDANGERED "SNAIL DARTER"
The long-protracted battles over the Tennessee Valley Authority's
Tellico Project, the region's last dam project-and especially the last six
years of battles waged over the little endangered snail darter fish-reflected
the Jeffersonian-Madisonian challenge in an extraordinary citizen effort that
the eminent ecology scholar E.O. Wilson has called "the Thermopylae in
the history of America's conservation movement." The Tellico Project
opposition, in which the author and his students played a significant part in
those final six years, 2 carried the case up through multiple state and federal
agencies, multiple courts, multiple Congresses, and multiple White Houses.
The facts of the case on the official record became clearer and clearer: the
dam and reservoir part of the project made no sense.
The unfortunate twist in the Tellico Dam case is that for the majority of
Americans who followed print or electronic media throughout the 1970s,
the snail darter was depicted as little more than a lightweight joke. The
Jeffersonian challenge was not met.
A. The TVA Tellico Project, 1959-1981-Basic Facts
Facing internal malaise 13 after three decades developing a sprawling
electric power system throughout the Tennessee River system, TVA
Chairman Aubrey "Red" Wagner called a high-level staff meeting on
Friday, February 13, 1959, to figure ways to justify "a new mission" for the
agency to rebuild morale within the agency. TVA was producing 90% of its
electricity with coal and nuclear energy; in effect it had become just a large
public utility company. Because sixty-eight dams had already been built on
the Tennessee River system, no suitable hydropower sites remained. But
Wagner hoped TVA could find new ways to justify building more projects
by imagining regional development justifications for a renewed sense of
mission.
It may be possible to demonstrate that added projects would contribute
enough to further regional development to amply justify their construction.
It may only depend on how ingenious and resourceful we can be in finding
a basis for evaluating a project's usefulness .... Come... and bring all the
optimism you have.'
Out of this meeting was birthed TVA's Tellico Project proposal. Its
major claimed economic development benefit justifications 5 were indeed
12. See supra note I and accompanying text.
13. See WHEELER & MCDONALD, supra note 3 (describing the history of the internal
crisis in morale within TVA that triggered the Tellico Project).
14. Id. at3-4.
15. Pursuant to Senate Document No. 97, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964), every federal
agency, when spending taxpayer dollars, had to show a theoretically profitable benefit-cost
2013]
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ingenious. The last undammed thirty-three miles of the Little Tennessee
River were too marginal a location to sustain the traditional dam project
justifications of energy or flood control. As Chairman Wagner
acknowledged to a reporter, a Tellico Dam's electric power potential and
flood control would be relatively "insignificant."' 16 To justify a dam and
reservoir, Wagner's economists were told to hypothesize expansive core
benefits in land development and recreation.
For land development benefits, instead of condemning just the land
needed for a dammed reservoir-roughly 12,000 acres-TVA would
condemn (or buy under threat of eminent domain) almost 38,000 acres,
sixty square miles, more than 300 family farms. The Boeing Corporation
from Seattle would take most of this private land for resale or development,
not for the reservoir. 17 Asa and Nell McCall's farm of ninety acres was
being taken though less than three acres would be flooded; the rest was
taken for re-sale. (The average price paid per acre was $330, exclusive of
buildings; homes and barns averaged about $6,000.)18 TVA and Boeing
announced they were designing a "model city" development, to be named
"Timberlake," for Lt. Henry Timberlake, the colonial officer who had
negotiated with the Cherokee and drawn the first map of the region in 1762.
Chairman Wagner said that within a few years the model city would have
50,000 residents and generate 25,000 jobs.
For recreational benefits, despite twenty-four flat-water reservoirs
already existing within fifty miles, by eliminating the last-remaining high-
quality big flowing river stretch in the Southeastern United States-which
regularly attracted trout fishermen from four surrounding states-TVA
economists projected that a flat-water Tellico lake would add $1.4 million
annually in net recreational benefits. These two constructed rationales
ratio-for every taxpayer dollar spent, a proposed project has to be able to claim to earn at
least $1.01 over 100 years.
16. Wagner admitted to a Knoxville Journal reporter that hydropower benefits from
Tellico Dam would be "relatively insignificant," KNOXVILLE JOURNAL (Sept. 23, 1964), at 1,
col. 2, and flood control benefits similarly limited. See TVA EIS, 1-1-49 (1972); see also
DARREN A. SHULER, ON OUR LAND: PROGRESS, DESTRUCTION, AND THE TVA's TELLICO DAM
PROJECT 97 (Thesis, Univ. of Georgia, 2000). The dam would have no generators. A
relatively small amount of power could be derived from building a canal into one of the two
adjacent reservoirs, Fort Loudon reservoir.
17. As its supersonic transport program was encountering serious problems in the
mid-1960s, the Boeing Corporation. looked for alternative lines of business. In partnership
with TVA Boeing engineers initiated a "model city" plan to build "Timberlake New Town"
based on the 1940s utopian city "Swatara" hypothesized by Athelstan Spilhaus in
Minnesota, which also came to naught; Boeing pulled out in 1975. In the 1950s and 1960s
TVA held a unique eminent domain power that allowed the agency to avoid courts and juries
in setting condemnation prices; three commissioners employed by TVA would assess the
prices to be paid, on average less than $400 an acre.
18. Documents on file with author.
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produced a theoretically profitable federal project plan. Based on these
projected economics, 19 TVA was easily able to engineer approval in the
House Appropriations Committee, the key committee for conveying
taxpayer dollars to "pork" projects in congressional districts around the
nation.
The Little Tennessee River, the "Little T," was beloved by many. The
local farmers who were being expropriated for the Tellico Project's
Timberlake development and for the reservoir were quickly joined in
opposition to the dam by a varied group of allies-troutfisherman who
loved the river, agricultural interests in the state, and Cherokees, historians,
and anthropologists who bemoaned the potential loss of unique cultural,
religious, and historic values in the valley.
The project's opponents argued (as citizen activists typically argue in
environmental cases) that-
. The project's proposed benefits were economically irrational
and unrealistic-the hypothesized "model city" benefits depended on
infeasible billion-dollar subsidies and could never occur; most recreation
usage would just be shifted from the twenty-four surrounding reservoirs.
* The project's anticipated costs were being grossly
underestimated-including a failure to value the loss of an agricultural
economy and of recreational and cultural resources,
* Attractive alternative development designs for the project were
being studiously ignored by the agency-farmers back on their lands,
tourism up through the river valley to the Great Smoky Mountains National
Park, with historic sites coordinated with the farmland agriculture, and
residential and industrial development at several key valley locations.
Environmental logic counsels that valid public project and program
decisions should be based on accurate accounting of real overall social
benefits, costs, and alternatives-a process which should be supported by
both liberals and conservatives, but in practice is rarely so.
The battles over the Tellico Project continued for most of two decades.
Below is a thumbnail chronology of significant dates:
1959: TVA begins planning the Tellico Project. E°
19. Beyond hyperbolic benefit projections, TVA economists were helped in
projecting their positive ratios by the fact that due to hyper-low official discount rates they
could treat the cost of taxpayer dollars as interest-free, or nearly so. Wagner also ordered his
staff to apply five dubious economic axioms: 1. Without the dam project, the Little
Tennessee River area would never develop economically; 2. The Tellico project would not
detract from any economic benefits already enjoyed in the area; 3. If a hypothetical
economic benefit could take place at Tellico, then it would; 4. All economic growth that
occurred in the area after project completion would be attributable to the project; and 5.
Project costs would not rise faster than the [low] annual inflation rate of the early 1960s. See
WHEELER & McDONALD, supra note 3, at 92-93.
20. Id. at 23-45.
2013] 509
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1964: Local citizens reject the TVA commission appointed to
promote the dam; they form Assoc. for Preservation of the Little T. River
(APLTR).21
1968: TVA pours concrete for Tellico Dam; dam structure stands
idle for several years.
1972: The Environmental Defense Fund wins a 16-month
injunction for farmers and their APLTR allies, due to TVA's failure to
prepare an environmental impact statement.23
1973: August 12: Dr. David Etnier discovers the "snail darter" in
the Little T at Coytee Spring shoals;24
Nov. 1: TVA prepares EIS-injunction dissolved. 5
Dec. 28: Richard Nixon signs the Endangered Species Act of 1973 into
law.26
21. See KIRK JOHNSON, A HISTORY OF OPPOSITION TO THE TVA TELLICO DAM
(unpublished), available at www.bc.edu/snaildarter.
22. The dam structure cost $4.08 million.
23. Envtl. Defense Fund v. TVA, 339 F. Supp. 806 (E.D. Tenn.), aff 'd, 468 F.2d
1164 (6th Cir. 1972).
24. See David A. Etnier, Introduction, 80 TENN. L. REv. (forthcoming Spring 2013).
The discovery is also recounted in SNAIL DARTER & THE DAM, supra note 3, at 33-34. Dr.
Etnier is a nationally prominent ichthyology expert with special eminence in the realm of
perch ichthyology; the snail darter is a diminutive perch. From the start it was Dr. Etnier's
surmise-later confirmed in further research-that the snail darter evolved with particular
adaptation to large, clean, flowing river habitats with clean substrates, a habitat type that had
been eliminated elsewhere throughout the Tennessee River system by more than five dozen
dams that impounded more than 2,000 linear miles of flowing river.
25. Envtl. Defense Fund v. TVA, 371 F. Supp. 1004 (E.D. Tenn. 1973), aff 'd, 492
F.2d 466 (6th Cir. 1974).
26. Pub. L. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (1973) (President's signing statement) "I have today
signed S. 1983, the Endangered Species Act of 1973. At a time when Americans are more
concerned than ever with conserving our natural resources, this legislation provides the
Federal Government with needed authority to protect an irreplaceable part of our national
heritage-threatened wildlife.
This important measure grants the Government both the authority to make early
identification of endangered species and the means to act quickly and thoroughly to save
them from extinction. It also puts into effect the Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora signed in Washington on March 3, 1973.
Nothing is more priceless and more worthy of preservation than the rich array of animal life
with which our country has been blessed. It is a many-faceted treasure, of value to scholars,
scientists, and nature lovers alike, and it forms a vital part of the heritage we all share as
Americans. I congratulate the 93d Congress for taking this important step toward protecting
a heritage which we hold in trust to countless future generations of our fellow citizens. Their
lives will be richer, and America will be more beautiful in the years ahead, thanks to the
[Vol. 80:501
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1974: October 12: Plater and student Hank Hill meet with farmers
and APLTR allies at old Fort Loudoun to plan a lawsuit-based on Hill's
environmental law term paper-arguing that Tellico Dam violated Section
7 of the ESA by endangering the darter's survival.27
1975: March: Boeing Corp. abandons the Timberlake project,
citing economic impracticality; TVA reaffirms intention to continue project
nonetheless, begins to evict landowners, bulldozing houses and barns. 28
June: Over TVA objections, in response to citizens' petition, Dept. of
Interior puts darter and its critical habitat on Endangered Species List.
1976: February: darter lawsuit filed in district court.30
May: District judge Robert Taylor finds facts for ESA Section 7
violations, but refuses to issue an injunction.3'
1977: January: Sixth Circuit grants injunction, saying that "[t]he
district court found that the completion of the Tellico Dam would
'jeopardize the continued existence of the snail darter,' and, therefore, we
must conclude that completion of the project would violate the Endangered
Species Act. The Tellico Dam project is not exempt from the provisions of
the Act." The injunction was immediately followed by a national outburst
of bemused attention for the darter and ESA. Citizens continued to push
river-based alternate development plans for Little T.32
measure that I have the pleasure of signing into law today." See also American Presidents
Project, UNIV. OF SANTA BARBARA, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ ws/index.php?pid=
4090 (last visited June 16, 2013).
27. The meeting at Fort Loudon is recounted in SNAIL DARTER & THE DAM, supra
note 3, at Chapter 2. The key 1973 language of ESA Section 7 creates two causes of action:
"All ... federal agencies shall ... ensure that actions authorized, funded, or carried out by
such agencies do not jeopardize the continued existence of such endangered species.. .or
result in the destruction or modification of habitat of such species which is determined...
critical." 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1973).
28. The Timberlake Project was excluded from the New Community Development
Act of 1975 which TVA and Boeing had hoped would grant a subsidy of close to a million
federal taxpayer dollars, but it included no funds for the Timberlake project. Housing and
Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383 (93d Cong., 2d Sess.) Aug. 22,
1974, effective Jan. 1, 1975. Boileau, O.C., Vice President, Boeing Corporation. March 3,
1975 Letter to Mr. Lynn Seeber, TVA General Manager: because of general economic
conditions, Boeing is pulling out of Timberlake venture. See KNOXVILLE JOURNAL, March 6,
1975.
29. 40 Fed. Reg. No. 197, 47505-47506 (Oct. 9, 1975).
30. CIV. 3-76-48, E.D. Tenn., Northern Division, filed Feb. 18, 1976.
31. Hill v. TVA, 419 F. Supp. 753 (E.D. Tenn. 1976).
32. Hill v. TVA, 549 F.2d 1064, 1075 (6th Cir. 1977).
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1978: June: Supreme Court upholds injunction.33
1979: January: Cabinet-level God Committee, created by Baker-
Culver ESA Amendments, unanimously upholds snail darter injunction on
economic grounds: although 95% of dam costs are spent, even total project
benefits don't justify spending the remaining 5% of project expenditures;
attractive economic alternatives exist.
34
Sept.-Nov.: Sen. Howard Baker and Rep. John Duncan push a stealth
rider amendment on the 1980 appropriations bill, over-riding the ESA, the
God Committee decision, and all applicable laws, to require completion of
Tellico Dam; through Senator Baker's pressure the bill narrowly passes;
Pres. Jimmy Carter fails to veto.
35
Nov. 29: a Cherokee lawsuit fails; final holdout farms bulldozed; TVA
completes reservoir and impounds river. Netted snail darters transferred to
several transplant locations.
6
1982: No development; embarrassed TVA proposes use of valley
as regional toxic waste facility; citizens' outcry after media story instantly
sinks toxic proposal.37
Nov. 26: TVA transfers 11,000 acres to development agency; former
landowners aren't allowed to make bids at the auction.38
1983: TVA begins cooperation with Bentonville, Arkansas
developers to create high-income resort-home development alongside the
reservoir.39
33. TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978). The Supreme Court process is chronicled in
SNAIL DARTER & THE DAM, supra note 3, at Chapter 9.
34. U.S. Department of Interior, Decision of Endangered Species Committee, Jan. 23,
1979 (unreported) (in archives of the Secretary of Interior, sitting as Chair), available at
www.bc.edu/snaildarter; see also SNAIL DARTER & THE DAM, supra note 3, at Chapter 10.
35. The TVA lawyers who drafted the override amendment included an express
exclusion not only of Section 7 of the ESA but also "or any other law..." because the
citizens had discovered further potential statutory violations: the dam itself violated legal
requirements for dam safety, historic preservation clearance, waterway alteration, and,
potentially, Native American burial protection.
36. Sequoyah v. TVA, 480 F. Supp. 608 (E.D. Tenn. 1979), aff'd, 620 F.2d 1159 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980).
37. See Waste Dump at Tellico Possible, KNOXVILLE NEws-SENTINEL (Sept. 29,
1982), at Al, col. I (final home ed.); Letter from Charles Dean, TVA Chairman, to Lamar
Alexander, Governor of Tennessee (May 20, 1982), available at Tellico Archives, Boston
College Law School).
38. See CBS interview with dispossessed Farmers, chronicled in SNAIL DARTER & THE
DAM, supra note 3, at Epilogue.
39. Cooper Communities, Inc., a private development corporation from Bentonville,
Arkansas acquired 4,592 acres of Tellico project shoreland for a stated $4,956,000 in a
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1984: Extensive flatwater recreation on reservoir; several
communities of high-income resort homes; light industrial development
near Highway 411; darter transplants look sufficiently established to allow
downlisting to "threatened."'40
The chronology reflects thousands of hours spent by the river defenders
in Tennessee, their allies in Washington, TVA staffers including the Law
Department managing the offensive against the snail darter, and literally
hundreds of Washington participants in administrative agencies, Congress,
and the various anti-regulatory lobbying corps.
The history of the case (particularly evident in the unanimous 1979
economic verdict of the God Committee concluding that the citizens
opposing the dam over the past sixteen years had been thoroughly correct
and TVA and its power bloc thoroughly wrong) reflects that the Tellico
Project's dam design had not only been economically unjustifiable from the
start. With 95% of the project costs expended it was also still unjustifiable.
The project destroyed more existing and potential public value than it
created. And yet, despite the dysfunctionality of the dam on the
demonstrated official record, the nation's political establishment had forced
the river impoundment into existence.
What is not consistently evident on the face of this summary
chronology of the darter case is the ever-present significance of how the
media treated the controversy. At every stage, however, the impact of how
the media reported or did not report the facts of the case had fundamental
significance on the citizens' ability to intrude the actual merits of the case
into the processes of national governance.
IV. A LINEAR HISTORY OF TELLICO PROJECT MEDIA COVERAGE ISSUES
Over the years of the snail darter controversy, the coverage, and non-
coverage, of the case by the media had profound direct impacts upon how
the organs of government reacted to the decisions presented by the conflict
between the fish and the Tellico Dam. From the start the citizens were
partial cash purchase. One executive was quoted as saying the company would rather have
developed along a river-as they had in Arkansas's White River region-than on the banks
of a reservoir. Ultimately there were five major resort home development companies to
which land was transferred to develop the project area. One has recently been reorganized in
bankruptcy.
40. For data on Tellico development, see Tellico Industries and Products, TELLICO
RESERVOIR DEVELOPMENT AGENCY (2007), available at http://www.tellico.com/libraries
/tinymce/tinymce/plugins/filemanager/files/TRDA%20Prospect% 20Booket.pdf. For notice
of snail darter downlisting, see Fish and Wildlife Service, 49 Fed. Reg. 27510-01 (July 5,
1984) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
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aware of the potential importance of media coverage, and worked hard
trying to pull journalists into recognition of the dramatic critical facts lying
at the heart of the case.
What follows is a linear sequence recounting some of the media
contacts and considerations that occurred over the history of the case in the
years after the discovery of the endangered darter.
A. At the Fort
From the very start of the snail darter case, at the potluck dinner
meeting of farmers and their allies at old Fort Loudoun that launched the
lawsuit, it was clear that an endangered species case against a dam would
initially be received by the media and the public as somewhat humorous, a
David and Goliath exchange that was more likely to be received as
ridiculously disproportionate rather than heroic.
A strong attempt was made that night to persuade the farmers to name
the case "Tellico Farmers v. TVA." Doing so would mean that reporters
would immediately go to see farmers being condemned or dispossessed;
America would learn of the extraordinary eminent domain/corporate resale
justification claims for the project, and public debate would then illuminate
the project's fabricated merits.41 The farmers, however, insisted that they
could not be the named plaintiffs. They had brought the 1972 NEPA case.
To bring the second suit would be seen locally as an unfair "second bite at
the apple." They promised, and proceeded, to work diligently over the next
several years to support the darter litigation, but the case would be named
for their University of Tennessee supporters. In retrospect, given the
importance of the media coverage and the narrowness of the citizens'
ultimate defeat, if the case had been named "Tellico Farmers v. TVA," the
Little T River might still be flowing.
In the evening meeting at Fort Loudoun the citizens expressly discussed
a hope that after the first flush of "fish-bites-dam" stories, after the first
week or two, reporters would have to look deeper into the merits of the case
41. TVA's condemnation resale calculations were even criticized by the Army Corps,
and attracted the opposition of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. The national reaction to the
Connecticut eminent domain development scheme in Kelo v. New London, 545 U.S. 469
(2005), reflects the volatile national political antagonisms that would predictably have
supported the Tennessee farmers' case against the dam from the start.
The debate on how to name the case is discussed in SNAIL DARTER & THE DAM, supra note 3,
at 54-55. On the duty of progressive lawyers to respect the wishes of informed potential
clients, see P. BERGMAN & P. TREMBLAY, LAWYERS As COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-CENTERED
APPROACH (3d ed. 2011).
42. The initial style of the case was "Hiram Hill, Zygmunt Plater, and Donald Cohen
v. TVA." Subsequently the Association of Southeastern Biologists, created by Dr. Etnier and
his associates, and the Tennessee Audubon Council, were joined as plaintiffs.
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for more of the story, and everything they'd find would bolster the case for
the fish and its river valley rather than for TVA's dam. It is a symptom of
the systemic problem addressed in this article that to a substantial extent
over the following years of intensive media coverage that never happened,
and the river and its valley were lost.
B. Trial
Media coverage of the snail darter case in Tennessee was almost
universally superficial throughout the years of controversy. The local
Tennessee dam opponent groups43 continually tried to get reporters to
scrutinize the fabricated economics of the project and the extremely
promising local and regional economic benefits available with an
alternative, river-based development design for valley lands. In story after
story, in print and electronically, the local press coverage usually framed
the controversy solely in terms of the fish versus the dam. To the extent that
the press noted the citizens' case against the dam's economics, it would be
to state in general terms their argument that the dam was economically
unsound. No article ever examined the official item-by-item TVA
justifications for the dam.44 And despite years of citizen attempts,45 no
43. The farmers, the plaintiffs, and their allies formed several Tennessee groups to
coordinate opposition to the dam-notably the Tennessee Endangered Species Committee
and the Little Tennessee River Alliance-which spoke at TVA public meetings, wrote letters
to editors and state and national political leaders, and raised money through potluck dinners,
sales of snail darter t-shirts, and the lithographic print of the snail darter that was admitted as
Exhibit 12 at trial.
44. The official benefit justification for the dam varied over the years, but the version
in the Tellico Project EIS is typical:





Fish and wildlife 220,000
Water supply 70,000
Shore land development [Timberlake] 714,000
Redevelopment 15,000
Total direct annual benefits: $3,760,000
Annual Costs:
Interest and amortization $2,045,000
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article, print or electronic, ever presented the local Tennessee public with
the existence of lucrative alternative development options for the river and
its valley.46
The darter trial in Knoxville was a big local story on the evening news,
with an artist's watercolor rendering of David Etnier looking closely at
several darters in test tubes appearing on television and local counsel Boone
Dougherty interrogating TVA's biology expert. But the coverage was
disappointingly limited. The two local papers' headlines were "Darter Has
Its Day in Court," and "Environmentalists Present Case in Federal Court."
Nothing about the biological destruction, much less anything questioning
the economic merits of the dam. One activist, Sara Grigsby, had tried to get
reporters to interview the farmers attending the trial, hoping the story would
cover the human and economic background of the case. Nothing was
mentioned about the homes and fields condemned for re-sale development.
Nothing about development alternatives. For whatever reason-a narrow
journalistic mindset or Judge Taylor's truncation of the trial evidence-the
press coverage of the trial was all local and all darter.
C. The Sixth Circuit Injunction
The snail darter story exploded nationally when, on January 31, 1977,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting in
Cincinnati, unanimously reversed the local Tennessee judge's dismissal of47-
the case and ordered that the Tellico Project be enjoined. Predictably, the
first reaction of the press coverage was the classic caricature. The snail
darter case was a clash between environment and economic progress, a
Cost-benefit ratio: 1.7:1.0
See Tennessee Valley Authority, Tellico Project Environmental Impact Statement, vol. I,
1972, 1-49 (both the General Accounting Office review (1977) and the God Committee
review (1979) concluded that all figures in this ratio were inaccurate). "The annual benefits
[in 1980 dollars]... are $6.5 million, compared to annual costs of $7.25 million." See infra
note 62 and accompanying text.
45. Including extensive descriptions of alternative development designs and maps
repeatedly placed in press packets and in the citizens' briefs to the courts and presented in a
University of Tennessee School of Architecture study of Little T River Alternatives.
46. The media reluctance appears to continue to the present. During the thirty-year
commemoration of the battles over the Little Tennessee River, an op-ed article and map
featuring the valley's foregone tourism, agriculture, residential, and industrial alternatives
was submitted to the local press but never achieved publication. No article or airtime has




"three-inch minnow" counterpoised against a "huge federal hydroelectric
dam."
The conservative talk radio syndicates around the country
characteristically jumped on the darter story as a parable of governmental
regulatory stupidity, a case where animals and plants were being given
precedence over the desperate energy needs of humans. Over the following
three years, the darter appeared repeatedly in newspapers and newscasts
around the nation, but the coverage was uniformly shallow, feeding a
continuing drumbeat of ridicule of the fish, and criticism of the Endangered
Species Act as "too rigid, too extreme," favoring environment over
economics. Even the major national newspapers of record replicated the
narrow surface caricatures, failing to report the engaging details of the
Tellico Project's contentious merits, questionable justifications, and the
public resources and available alternative designs at stake.
The New York Times, for example, in a feature article two months after
the appeals court victory, reported the darter-dam story in a manner that
exemplified most of the national coverage then and thereafter. Carrying the
headline "Giant TVA Stalled by Controversy over 3-Inch Fish," the March
22 story declared-
LENOIR CITY, TENNESSEE. [It is] a classic struggle between ecology and
economics, [between] the huge earth-and-concrete Tellico Dam [and
environmentalists] who reject ... arguments that the dam would be an
economic boon to the area. They are not concerned that they halted the
impoundment ...after more than $100 million had been spent ...
[quoting Dave Etnier] "the fish is more important than the dam." ...
Nellie McCall is adamantly against the project ...... "The whole thing is
just another land grab." [A local businessman, on the other hand, says]
"It's a mess .... Things have gone too far to turn back for a little fish and
we ought to finish it.". . . Aubrey J. Wagner went to Washington to plead
with Congress to "balance" the Endangered Species Act ... Now at stake
is the Endangered Species Act [itself]: as interpreted thus far by the
courts, the Act does not permit [sensible balancing].3
The article parallels the media's typical framing of the story:
0 Public policy needed to choose between ecology and economics-
we implicitly can't have both. Quoting Wagner the article said the Act
placed "human needs... well down our list of environmental priorities...
* The snail darter story was in reductive terms simply a little fish
causing economic losses by blocking a huge (and implicitly hydroelectric)
dam.
• Tellico is referred to as a "more than $100 million" dam, ignoring
the fact that the majority of the budget was being spent for roads, bridges,
and land condemnations, the dam itself only a small fraction of the total.
0 There was no mention that the dam project had been justified on the
basis of recreation and hypothetical real estate development, not power or
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flood control, and that Boeing had abandoned the city development plan
two years earlier.
• The citizens resisting the dam are identified as "the
environmentalists" who either care only about the fish, as in the quotation
from Dr. Etnier, or care about the fish only to stop development.
* There was no mention of available alternative development designs
for the valley, much less the inherently more economically valuable and
readily available tourism route up through the valley to the National Park.
* If the press quoted landowners, as the Times reporter here quoted
Nell McCall, it's always implied that their lands are being taken for a power
generation reservoir; the reporters did not explain that most of the 300
family farms were being taken for resale in the corporate real estate scheme
that Boeing Corp. had in fact abandoned.
* Like most articles, the Times story also adds the knowing prophesy
that the snail darter case now endangered the survival of the Endangered
Species Act itself, noting inaccurately that other big projects were being
halted by the ESA.48
In these elements, the Times story, like most stories on the case,
skipped superficially over all the core issues integral to the public policy
question presented in the Tellico controversy. Even more distressing, like
many national reporters, the Times reporter who wrote the article, R.
Drummond Ayres, had actually visited Tennessee to investigate the story.
Members of the river defender groups had spent time briefing him, taking
48. In the Circuit Court decision Hill v. TVA, 549 F.2d 1064 (6th Cir. 1977), Judge
Wade McCree concurred separately, stating the stark essence of the case: "The district court
found that the completion of the Tellico Dam would 'jeopardize the continued existence of
the snail darter,' and, therefore, we must conclude that completion of the project would
violate the Endangered Species Act." Id. at 1075. The author observed Judge McCree taking
copious notes, he thought, during the oral argument, but it turned out he actually was writing
a limerick:
Who can surpass the snail darter,
the fish that would not be a martyr?
It [expletive-d] the dam,
near the place where it swam.
Can you think of a fish any smarter?
The Act forbids completion of construction projects that would wipe out the habitat of any
living thing rated as endangered. In Maine, for instance, the Act is being used to stall plans
for a big hydroelectric project because an endangered snapdragon might be wiped out.
The latter statement references the fact that "Furbish's lousewort," an unfortunately named
endangered plant in Maine, had been discovered within the boundaries of the Army Corps of
Engineers' Dickey-Lincoln power dam project in Maine. That dam, however, was being
successfully challenged by the National Audubon Society because it lacked an adequate
environmental impact statement under NEPA. The endangered species issue had been raised
only by the Corps itself, presumably to generate public ridicule against the ESA and those
who were criticizing the dam project.
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him around the valley and into their homes. He had visited with Asa and
Nell McCall. The Times article, however, didn't question TVA's "economic
boon" claims, nor mention that the fish's survival might bring far more
lucrative river-based economic development options, nor note that most of
the "$100 million" expenditure was for beneficial infrastructure, not for the
dam. The Times article cited Nell's pain at losing her farm but didn't note
that most of her land, like most of the thirty thousand-plus acres of private
land condemned by the government, was actually being taken for private
corporate real-estate development, not for a reservoir, and it wasn't a
hydroelectric dam.
D. Post-Injunction Political Coverage: Washington, D.C.
This kind of news reporting too easily made the snail darter and the Act
the butt of anti-environmental jokes and outraged oratory around the
country. Paul Harvey, the acerbic faux-populist radio commentator,
regularly used the darter as an example of environmentalism and regulatory
government run amok. Ronald Reagan, who after leaving the governorship
of California had resumed his syndicated media commentaries for the
electric power industry, complained that the darter's blocking of a "dam
[designed] to generate electric power" shows "the absurdity of the present
endangered species law which gives priority to tiny fish, weeds, and spiders
regardless of the merits of any proposed project.' 4
Editorials around the country echoed the same cant:
"Snail Darter: Example of Extremism"
"Snail Darter: Absurdity for Environmentalism"
"Environmental Overkill"
"Environmentalists' Newest Allies Kill Job-Making Projects '50
The "extremism" narrative that prevailed in the media-greatly fueled
by industry newsletters and public relations-consistently served to
strengthen political attacks against the Endangered Species Act,
environmental laws, and progressive regulation generally.
The citizens' efforts in Washington to drum up informed coverage
affirming the Endangered Species Act as well as the darter gained little
traction. Every week they put together new press briefing packets.
Volunteer interns from the national environmental groups spent evenings
49. Ronald Reagan, radio broadcasts, October 18 and 29, 1977, quoted in KIRON K.
SKINNER, ANNELISE ANDERSON, & MARTIN ANDERSON, REAGAN'S PATH TO VICTORY: THE
SHAPING OF RONALD REAGAN'S VISION: SELECTED WRIrINGS 214, 231, 367 (New York Free
Press 2004).
50. See, e.g., TOLEDO BLADE (Jun. 26, 1978); KNOXVILLE NEWS-SENTINEL (Dec. 3,
1977); MILWAUKEE JOURNAL (Feb. 2, 1977); SPOKANE SPOKESMAN-REVIEW (Jun. 17, 1977);
NEW YORK TIMES (Mar. 14, 1977); NEWs-TRIBUNE (Rome, New York) (May 9, 1978).
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collating stacks of photocopied pages on the floor of Friends of the Earth
and mornings dropping these packets into mailboxes at the National Press
Building and other media offices around town. No discernible changes in
coverage came from these efforts, however. The Associated Press wire
service-with its constant electronic feed to more than six thousand
American newspaper, radio, and television newsrooms--continued to carry
the standard boilerplate darter-dam cliches around the country, not the
essential facts. As one volunteer mused dourly, "If a tree falls in the
wilderness, and it isn't covered by the Associated Press newswire, did it
really happen?"
Every month, a few carloads of farmers or representatives of the
Eastern Band of Cherokees came to Washington. They would try to get the
Tellico Dam story through to the media and also walk the halls of Congress.
They set up news interview opportunities so reporters could see real people
who had a personal stake in the snail darter's case.
Despite the repeated references being made to the case in the media,
getting through to the press was difficult. One example: a press conference
arranged in May 1977-a press packet was sent to four dozen journalists'
offices in the National Press Building, and a major interview notice posted
in the Washington press's "Daybook," the listing sent to all media offices
each morning:
10:30 a.m. Cannon House Office Building, Front Entrance Portico,
Independence Avenue-Press Availability: endangered species-the TVA
Tellico Dam-Meet with Tennessee farmer dam opponents whose land is
being condemned, and a Cherokee representative on the ancient history at
stake.
The group of Tennesseans gathered by the Cannon portico at 10 a.m.,
rehearsing elements of the story to be impressed upon the reporters.
Displaced farmers Nell McCall, Alfred Davis, and Jean Ritchey sharpened
some barbed lines about the misrepresented nature of TVA's land
condemnations. Nell, visibly frail, had her daughter Margaret and son-in-
law, Joe Sexton, along with her at the portico. Laura King was a quiet but
regal presence for the Cherokees, ready to speak with forceful passion when
the time came. The Tennesseans waited. And waited. As a dispiriting hour
passed, no reporters came. The little group squared its shoulders and
marched off to the corridors of the Capitol, Jean leading the way, looking
for politicians to lobby. This was hard to take. Since Nixon and Watergate
they'd been hearing about the notorious liberal press. Shouldn't the liberal
press have taken an interest in a story like this? Where were they?
Over these months the darter groups talked with more than a hundred
individual reporters working for the big networks, National Public Radio,
the newswires, and a host of newspapers and magazines-speaking with
some of them more than a dozen times. Walter Cronkite, the dean of
American journalism, directed two of his CBS researchers to talk with a
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representative of the Tennesseans. They spent an hour going through the
data, taking copious notes. That evening the darter groups tuned in to the
six o'clock news hoping to hear Cronkite at last tell the American public
the awkward realities of the Tellico Dam. It didn't happen. Cronkite began
the segment with, "We all have heard about the three-inch minnow that has
stopped a $150-billion [sic] hydroelectric dam . . ." and the story went
downhill from there, quoting politicians saying that the injunction was a
fluke and would soon be reversed in the political process because the snail
darter case made no sense.
Through Washington environmental contacts, the Tennesseans got a
long interview with a reporter from the Wall Street Journal. He paid close
attention to details of the Tellico Project's shaky economics, with the
Tennessee maps laid out to show the broad extent of condemned private
farmlands. He was clearly impressed, saying that the dam project looked
like a classic pork project, basically irrational in economic terms. Good.
When would he do the story? "Oh, I can't write this," he told them. "It goes
against our editorial policy." But, the darter representatives remonstrated,
he was a news reporter for the Journal, not writing for the editorial page."
That wasn't the point, the reporter replied. "Our policy is not to publish
articles like this." He didn't clarify what "articles like this" meant, and after
two wasted hours he departed. The Journal later published an editorial
criticizing the Endangered Species Act, noting "all the dams and energy
projects" that had been foolishly halted by the Act.
Through luck and several strategic assistances from some
environmental groups in the capital, the Tennesseans were able to prevent a
lightning attempt to pass a statutory override nullifying the Sixth Circuit's
injunction led by Senator Baker."1 As the political turmoil over the dam
continued to chum, however, it was clear to the citizens that Congress
responded to the press far more than to individual citizen groups.
E. Senate Hearings
Major Senate hearings were held on the snail darter and the Endangered
Species Act in July 1977.52 The darter defense group expected major press
51. Shortly after the injunction was ordered, Senator Baker had announced he would
push an override through the Congress, in the same way that a "blackbird bill" had been
passed in two days time clearing the way for authorities to poison hundreds of thousands of
starlings that were covering the Fort Knox area with guano; the bill passed but the poisoning
did not work very well. The political turning point in preventing a similar snail darter
override was when Robert Leggett, the House subcommittee chair for the relevant
committee, declared that there would be no more blackbird bills on his watch. See THE
SNAIL DARTER & THE DAM, supra note 3, at 138.
52. Endangered Species Act Oversight: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Resource
Protection of the Sen. Comm. on the Envtl. & Pub. Works, 95th Cong. 6-23, 133-76, 178-
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attention. The snail darter was continually being mentioned in industry
trade newsletters, newspaper editorials and letters to the editor, and the
potential need for hearings had been a major argument against a quick-
strike override amendment. But the Senate committee staffers and the
Washington environmental lobbyists advised that the darter group make
special effort to ensure that the press came to the hearings. Having reporters
at hearings is a major determinant of whether the hearings have any impact
at all.
As the Senate endangered species hearing began, no reporter had shown
up, and only two junior senators were at the dais. The chamber door behind
the dais opened and Committee Chairman Jennings Randolph lumbered in
and took a seat. Senator Randolph sat at the dais with a blank look on his
face, exhibiting little awareness of what was going on. After fidgeting for a
few minutes he had an aide pass a scrawled note to the Tennesseans'
representative: "Where's thePost?!"
It was a bad moment. One of the darter defenders had tried to pull a fast
one, calling the senator's staffer the day before, urging Chairman Randolph
himself to come to the hearings because a reporter from the Washington
Post would be there. The mention of the Post clearly made an impression,
but in truth, Margot Homblower of the Post had said only that she might be
there. So the darter group had called her at home before breakfast that
morning to say she should attend the hearing because the full committee
would be there. The reporter said that if the Committee Chairman was
coming, she'd be there. Now Senator Randolph was there, but the reporter
wasn't. Randolph fidgeted some more, and glanced at us irritably. Ten
minutes later, however, the Post's reporter swished into the room and took
a seat. All three senators immediately took notice and shifted forward in
their chairs. Chairman Randolph furrowed his brow, focused his gaze on
the witness who was speaking, and to all appearances began listening
intently.
The hearing's first day, however, did not feature any emotional
moments or confrontations. The Post article ran on an inside page and was
anodyne. Headlined "Wildlife Species Act Endangers Project; Change in
Law Opposed," it almost totally bypassed testimony emphasizing the
Endangered Species Act's administrative successes, instead focusing on the
law's supposed potential for obstructing economic development. "The ESA
may be endangering 52 projects ranging from the $4-billion Tennessee-
Tombigbee Waterway to small stream-dredging operations in Virginia and
Maryland."" That had not been said in the hearing; it apparently had been
pulled from a memo from Senator Baker's office, with an added quote
300, 357-93, 516-49 (July 20-22, 1977).
53. Homblower, Wildlife Species Act Endangers Project; Change in Law Opposed,
WASHINGTON POST, Jul. 21, 1977, at A3.
[Vol. 80:501
PLATER
criticizing the law's inflexibility. The article mentioned the Tellico conflict
only briefly near the end, saying there might soon be an economic
reassessment.
The Senate hearings in two following days produced some sterling
moments, but Americans saw virtually none of it. There was no television
feed, and the hearings were barely mentioned in the papers except for a few
brief paragraphs the day after. Details about Tellico Dam economics from a
scathing report from the Government Accounting Office, the bountiful
benefits of river development demonstrated by the Hanson Study, the
farmers' land losses, and the Act's affirmative track record-none of these
were picked up by the national press.54
Even when reporters were following the story, their editors often did
not seem interested in having them dig into the issue. Ward Sinclair, a Post
reporter, apologized that all he could get his editors to accept were stories
on the political backlash against the darter and the Act; even so the only
way that he had gotten a recent story into the paper had been a fluke. He
had written that the darter case was starting a "pork panic." When the
headline writers saw that, they had put it up at the top of the piece: "'Pork
Panic' Sweeping Congress in Wake of Darter's Rescue." His editor hadn't
wanted to run the story, Sinclair said, "but with a headline like that he had
to."
55
Perhaps a scandal could trigger press attention? Hank Hill discovered
recorded deeds where TVA General Manager Lynn Seeber and his wife had
bought more than a dozen land parcels around the project area during the
time that Seeber was making decisions whether or not to halt the project in
compliance with the federal law, a clear conflict of interest. And Seeber
himself, as General Manager, was the official in TVA responsible for
policing ethics and conflicts of interest. No Tennessee media would run the
story. "It implies Seeber's bad faith," said Ernie Beazley, a sympathetic
54. Prior to the hearings the Tennesseans were able to instigate an investigative report
to Congress on the economics and alternatives to the Tellico Dam done by the GAO (then
known as the General Accounting Office, subsequently renamed the Government
Accountability Office). The Comptroller-General's team concluded that TVA's justifications
for Tellico "do not give a truly valid picture," were "statistically weak," and were "inflated."
The GAO report ended with an unusually decisive "Conclusion and Recommendation to
Congress: Congress should prohibit by law the Authority from spending any more
appropriations for work on the project that would further endanger the darter" or be wasted
if the dam was not completed. See Comptroller-General of the United States, Report to the
Congress: The TVA's Tellico Dam Project-Costs, Alternatives, and Benefits, EMD-77-58
(Oct. 14, 1977), and SNAIL DARTER & THE DAM, supra note 3, at 183-187, 201. Reinforcing
the author's recollection that no national press story reported the GAO's dramatic report, a
LexisNexis search revealed only one story even mentioning the study, written almost a year
later. See Dick Kirschten, Acting on Endangered Species, NAT'L. J., Jul. 22, 1978, at 1176.
55. Ward Sinclar, "Pork Panic" Sweeping Congress in Wake of Darter's Rescue,
WASHINGTON POST (Jun. 28, 1978), at A2.
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Knoxville Journal reporter. "My editors would say it's slander. We won't
touch it." Attempts to get the Seeber deeds story into the national press
fared no better. Jack Anderson, the national gadfly muckraker, initially
showed interest, but after reviewing the deeds and project specifics, decided
that it was a local matter with too many complicated details for a national
audience to understand.
In Washington, the darter groups continued to try to awaken press
coverage to draw attention to the real merits of the case. In anticipation of
an upcoming Senate vote an Associated Press reporter, David Espo, joined
some of the darter volunteers for an informal picnic lunch out on the
Capitol lawn, lured by an attractive female volunteer. He listened to an
array of detailed facts on the project's economics and alternatives, but he
laughed wryly when asked to do an analytical story prior to the
congressional debate. "You'd like us to do a story now, right? To get
information out before the vote. We won't do it. We aren't supposed to
make news, we just report it." Informing the public and political process in
advance of significant decisions, he said, was not the Press's role. Madison
and Jefferson would sigh in dismay.
The darter campaign did encounter, however, several hopeful media
breaks. In the late summer after the Sixth Circuit injunction, both CBS and
ABC sent film crews to the valley to do stories on the battle on the Little T.
The farmers and other volunteers in Tennessee spent hours with each of
them.5 6 The crews went back to New York and the Tennesseans waited for
the stories to run. They didn't. As the producers explained, the networks
couldn't find a niche to run the stories. ABC producer Aram Boyagian said
the network had done a lot of environment stories lately. Reminded of the
Cherokee angle, he said that the network had done a lot of Indian stories,
too. So what would they need as a "hook" to run the story they filmed? The
answer I got: if they "find Senator Baker schtupping a milkmaid along the
banks of the Little Tennessee River," that would probably be enough of a
hook. What gets presented to the public apparently is determined by the
management's sense of what will grasp or entertain the fickle interests of
the public.
F. The Supreme Court
The context of the Supreme Court arguments and decision also offered
missed opportunities for the media to grasp and communicate the facts of
the case. The citizens' brief and oral argument were laden with analysis of
56. CBS's Al Wasserman and his crew made multiple trips, getting to know many of
the farmers and the mordant details of TVA's land condemnations for resale. Harry
Reasoner for CBS's 60 Minutes probed the project's economics. With producer Aram
Boyagian, ABC's Roger Anderson of the television news magazine 20/20 were interested in
the David and Goliath angle of the battle between local citizens and TVA.
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the facts and merits of the case as much as the law of it, but media coverage
of the Court proceedings continued to focus simplistically on the
juxtaposition between the little fish itself and the implicitly valuable dam,
as well as noting the legal question whether an injunction was appropriately
issued.
57
When the Supreme Court decision dramatically upheld the Sixth
Circuit injunction eighteen months after it had been issued, the story was
bannered on the front pages of major newspapers and evening newscasts
across the nation.58 The text of the stories, however, did not reflect the
substantive elements of the agency's justifications for the dam or the
citizens' arguments against the dam and for the beneficial alternatives.5 9
G. The God Committee
Whereas the Court's affirmance of the darter halting the dam had gotten
national front-page coverage, when the Cabinet-level God Committee
issued its dramatic verdict six months later-unanimously concluding that
the project had never been economically justified, wasn't worth finishing,
and that beneficial alternatives still existed-the national media largely
ignored the story or ran brief summaries reciting the Committee's verdict
but not specifying the facts that produced it. 60 The turned-table story of the
57. The briefs filled in the case are accessible in the snail darter website document
archive. Digital Commons, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW SCHOOL, www.bc.edu/snaildarter (last
visited May 29, 2013). On the Supreme Court steps, after oral argument, the author missed a
prime opportunity to force the facts into media consciousness. After the Attorney General
had brandished a little bottle containing a dead snail darter for the cameras, the author made
comments focusing on the statutory violation rather than the dam's merits and alternatives or
the project's expansive farmland condemnations. Further opportunity was lost the day of the
Court's decision. See SNAIL DARTER & THE DAM, supra note 3, at 264-65, 268-69.
58. Morton Mintz, Court: Dam Must Yield to Snail Darter, WASHINGTON POST (Jun.
16, 1978), at Al. A New York Times article by Warren Weaver also ran on Al, as did the
story coverage on many of that day's papers.
59. In the June 1978 Washington Post article, for example, the story contained more
than 1,000 words, but the only reference to the project's economics and alternatives that had
been emphasized in oral arguments and multiple press releases delivered to the Capitol
media was to note "the dam ... would, in violation of the law, inundate the only known
habitat of the darter in the Little Tennessee River, as well as 16,500 acres of valuable
farmland and native American and Cherokee Indian archeological sites," and quoting David
Freeman that alternatives "may even produce greater benefits for the people." Mintz, supra
note 57, at Al (emphasis added).
60. A typical example of the Associated Press wire story: the Pittsburgh Post-
Gazette, on January 24, 1979, ran the first seven paragraphs of the wire text, mentioning
none of the dramatic negative economic analysis.
Two of the bottom paragraphs in the full fourteen-paragraph wire text did contain quotes
indicating an undefined "reasonable alternative" and annual operating costs exceeding
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God Squad decision verdict-that the darter's case made economic sense-
was run back on page 12 in the Times, page 24 in the Washington Post. The
Wall Street Journal, which had railed so raucously against species litigation
and called for sober economic analyses to resolve such controversies, put it
on page 18. A story was sent out on the Associated Press wire service, but
many newspapers and local stations chose not to run it, and those that did
almost uniformly failed to mention the economics. The dramatically revised
darter-dam story was brimming with legal, political, economic, even
philosophical import. It could have shaped a long-running news cycle with
successive stories on all the intriguing features of the saga-Indians,
farmers, agency pork, corrupt officials, junk science, fraudulent economics,
David revealing Goliath to be a midget, the important implications for other
federally-subsidized boondoggles, an affirmation of American pluralist
democracy as local citizens with no political power could carry an issue to
the highest levels in the land and win, and finally the unique Committee of
God. But where previously the darter's quixotic legal victories had
regularly been featured, with ironic photos, on the front pages of the
nation's newspapers, or as a lead story or final story on the nightly news,
the God Committee verdict, the most upbeat chapter of the darter story, was
downplayed.
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H. The Override Amendment
When TVA and its allies in the public works and anti-environmental
industry blocs in the capital inserted the stealth rider onto the annual TVA
appropriations bill removing the protections of the Endangered Species Act
"or any other laws" from the snail darter and the Little Tennessee River,
several major newspapers wrote editorials decrying the unfair parliamentary
maneuver.6 Again, however, beyond the magazines and newsletters
published by the national environmental citizens organizations,62 the merits
and demerits of the project itself and the existence of beneficial alternatives
were not visible in the national media coverage.
Just before the final vote in both the House and Senate, Secretary
Andrus, who had supervised the God Committee's ninety-day economic
review and chaired the Committee deliberations that had condemned the
dam project's economics sent an urgent letter to all 535 Members of
Congress.
I wish to express our grave concem .... Last year Congress directed a
special seven-member committee which I chair to determine whether the
dam should be exempted from the Endangered Species Act .... After due
consideration we found that ... the project is not justified. In fact, when
the committee compared the full range of project benefits against only the
remaining-costs of completing the Tellico Dam... we found that [just the
remaining] costs of the project exceed its benefits. We also found: The
annual benefits . . . are $6.5 million, compared to annual costs of $7.25
million;., only $22.5 million has been sunk into actual construction of the
dam;... Tellico does not meet current BuRec standards for dam safety;...
energy benefits [are minimal]; ... one third of annual project benefits are
justified on the basis of flat water recreation, [ignoring] 24 other [dams]
within a 60-mile radius; ... free-flowing river [recreation benefits] exceed
those of the dam by $600,000 a year; . . . Tellico reservoir would tie up
approx. $40 million in private [agricultural] land values;... [and other]
serious economic problems ....
61. A New York Times editorial, for example, declared that "This sort of thing
endangers more than fish." Editorial, Looking Down, NEW YoRK TIMES (Jun. 20, 1979), at
A22, col. 2.
62. The national environmental citizen groups regularly carried stories in their
publications analyzing the faults of Tellico Dam and emphasizing the common sense merits
of the case for the snail darter and the river; the green media, however, clearly did not
penetrate to mainstream America or the mainstream press.
63. Secretary of Interior Cecil Andrus, Chairman of the Endangered Species
Committee, Letter to Members of Congress: Re: Tellico Dam Decision of the Endangered
Species Committee, Jul. 16, 1979, available at www.bc.edu/snaildarter.
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Ultimately both chambers voted for the targeted Tellico Dam
amendment to override the Supreme Court decision and the God Committee
economic verdict.64 After the God Committee process and Secretary
Andrus's powerful letter, it is clear that the Members of Congress who
voted in the majority for the override all knew the true merits of the issue.
But they also knew that America did not know, and therefore, absent public
cognition, were free to cast the vote based on the pork politics that so often
characterize congressional voting instead of on the demonstrated public
interest.
L The White House
At the urging of the Carter White House, the Tennesseans and their
capital allies collected voting commitments from legislators in both House
and Senate amply sufficient to uphold the President's veto (as only one
chamber is needed to uphold a veto).65 President Jimmy Carter prepared a
veto message, but in the end, he signed the bill with the override
amendment attached. According to the account of a White House staffer,
Carter was prepared to veto the bill until he was persuaded otherwise by his
congressional liaison, Frank Moore. Reportedly Moore had said that if the
President vetoed the bill, "tomorrow morning every editorial cartoonist in
the nation will have a drawing of you holding a snail darter in one hand and
a killer rabbit in the other. You just can't stand that kind of ridicule in the
press."66 (During a fishing trip, the President's boat had been approached by
64. The House voted 214 to 184 to override the Supreme Court and the God
Committee. House Roll Call No. 427, 125 Cong. Rec. 21,987-22,011 (Aug. 1, 1979). In the
Senate, after two rejections of the stealth rider, the House version of the appropriations bill
with rider attached passed Senate by four votes (after Senator Baker halted the vote and
persuaded four colleagues to change their cast votes from "nay" to "yea") and was sent to
President Carter. Senate Roll Call Vote No. 269, 125 Cong. Rec. 23,863-872 (Sept. 10,
1979) (TVA winning forty-eight to forty-four, including eight abstentions).
65. The citizens clearly had confirmed sufficient votes to block an override of the
veto that President Carter's staff indicated was coming. To override a presidential veto, both
chambers must vote by at least two-thirds. Thus on the Senate side, thirty-four of one
hundred senators are needed to block the two-thirds majority that can override a veto; at
White House's behest, the darter group gained firm commitments from forty-one senators of
the forty-four who had supported the darter in the Senate vote, like South Dakota's Tom
Daschle, whose aide said he hadn't realized what his prior vote had meant. In the House,
where 146 out of 435 are necessary to block the override of a presidential veto the darter
group had confirmed strong commitments from almost 170.
66. The non-veto story was relayed by Marion Edey, of the President's Council of
Environmental Quality. Carter later explained the "killer rabbit" story that caused a media
tumult to CNN's Howard Kurtz: a rabbit was being chased by dogs, jumped into the water,
and swam toward the boat; the picture of the President fending off the rabbit with a paddle
was amplified into his dodging an attack. Cody Combs, Jimmy Carter explains "rabbit
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a swimming rabbit; a photographer snapped a picture of the President
fending off the "attacking" "killer rabbit," and the press had reverberated
the story for weeks.) That perhaps was what finally pushed the President to
sign the bill. The cautionary point is that in fact it might be true, which
underscores how years of citizens' work building a case on the merits could
be overturned by a president's fear of media coverage. A president who
wanted to make the right decision in the public interest-backed by law,
facts, economics, common sense, and more than enough votes to support
his veto in both chambers-was unable to do so because of his own shaky
media stature and because public opinion had been skewed by years of
journalism's negligent performance of its public information role.
The morning after President Carter's non-veto, the Tennesseans
announced a press conference in protest. This time their hopes for reporters'
attention were fulfilled; the room was jammed. Why now, finally? The
reporters listened, scribbling notes as the Cherokees described the beautiful
valley and its unique place in their history and culture. They asked
questions as the maps were shown and facts presented about how it was a
recreation project and a land development scheme, not a hydroelectric dam,
with proven diseconomies, condemnation of farmland for resale, and more.
Doesn't this seem like a huge mistake, the citizens asked? How could
the president, the Congress, the agencies, how could the Press have let this
happen? A reporter in the front row reacted with a yelp, Phil Shabecoff of
the Times, a pioneer in covering environmental stories. "How can you say
that?!" Shabecoff asked. "How come it's only now we hear all of this?
About the farmers' land being taken for real estate development, about
benefits getting so inflated, about Cherokees. Why weren't we told this
long ago? It's a story that the American people needed to hear!" The
Tennesseans erupted at that, noting that they had been trying to get
reporters to cover this exact story for almost three years with dozens of
information packets delivered at the press buildings, with photos, maps,
explanations of how this dam was an economic disaster; quotes and
information from the God Committee decision; press conferences with
farmers when no reporters came. Shabecoff looked chastened, but it was
too late. The press had just never gotten around to paying attention until the
case's conclusion.
attack," CNN (Nov. 21, 2010, 2:03 P.M.), http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2010/11/21/
jimmy-carter-explains-rabbit-attack/.
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J. Tellico Dam, Post-Closure
In the years after the final impoundment of the Little Tennessee River,
the state's press has rarely mentioned the Tellico Project controversy, and
the snail darter nationally and regionally remains an anachronism.
The affirmative power of a focused press, however, was vividly
demonstrated two years after the dam's closure. In September 1982, the
author received a clandestine tip from contacts within TVA that the agency,
embarrassed by the absence of project development, was preparing to
propose the development of portions of the project lands along the reservoir
for a regional toxic waste disposal facility. When the author passed theP67
leaked information to the local United Press newswire, however, where it
quickly went viral, TVA abandoned the plan within just twenty-four hours.
V. WHY DID THE PRESS NEGLECT THE MERITS OF THE DARTER CASE?
The foregoing chronology of intersections between the snail darter, the
three official branches of national government, and the media repeatedly
illustrates both the importance of accurate communication of significant
information to the public and the deficits in the political process and
political accountability when basic essential information is not
communicated.68 It is altogether probable that if the press had
communicated the true economics of the Tellico Project to the Tennessee
public-and even more important the available alternative development
options that were far more valuable to the regional populace if the dam,
even when completed, were dropped as obsolete-the river would still be
flowing. If the national media had communicated those economic facts, and
the truth about the majority of the sixty square miles of family farmlands
being condemned for speculative re-sale by Boeing Corporation, the pork
barrel would not have dared to override the law and the God Committee
economic verdict to finish such a dysfunctional project. But in both realms,
local and national, the press simply and repeatedly fouled up.
A. State and Local Media
So why didn't the Tennessee media look into the facts of the Tellico
Dam case-the dramatic issues of farmland condemnation and sketchy
67. According to 1980 notes, the UPI reporter to whom the author gave the story was
Ed DeLong. The resulting story appeared in a Knoxville paper and galvanized a rapid
reversal. See John Moulton, Waste Dump at Tellico Possible, KNOXVILLE NEwS-SENTINEL
(Sept. 29, 1982).
68. See also Harry S. Mattice, Jr., Winning a Battle, Losing a War: The "Snail Darter




economics, the GAO report censuring the project on benefit-cost grounds,
the God Committee's unanimous economic verdict against the dam?
Digging into the embarrassing facts of the project's justifications and
preferable non-dam alternatives was apparently not a task that the local
media was motivated to undertake. Tennessee's daily papers never explored
whether the dam's economics might be shaky or that better alternatives
might exist.
In part, the local press's reluctance may reflect the history of the region.
When major initiatives had been accomplished, it was TVA that had done
them. TVA was a dominating presence in the daily life of the region. It
defined the local and regional political establishment. TVA press releases
and its public information office were treated as unquestionable writ, and
the contrarian arguments raised by Little T farmers and their allies appeared
tainted with a sense of illegitimacy or iconoclastic marginality. 69 Given the
agency's widespread power, opposition to TVA's will was dangerous; those
who harbored doubts about agency projects and programs tended to keep
their heads down.
Realistically, the dam opponents always expected Tennessee's regional
media to be passive. Some local newspapermen were true Tellico Dam
believers, like the crusading editor of the Tri-County Observer, Dan Hicks,
who gained national recognition for countering the Ku Klux Klan. His
paper maintained loud support for TVA's promises of economic
modernization, going so far as to call the Tellico Dam project "just a
godsend [and] the greatest thing that ever happened to this area! 70
TVA's press office dominated local print and electronic media. In a few
cases, when reporters daringly wrote articles indicating doubts about
Tellico Dam, TVA stifled their inquiries by hiring them away to work for
the agency. In other cases, it directly intervened; after his editors were
pressured by TVA, Sam Venable, a senior Knoxville reporter confided, "I
was told I would not column on Tellico!,,
71
The political culture of Tennessee undoubtedly shaped the editorial
policies of many local media enterprises. According to reporters we talk to,
local newspaper editors and TV and radio producers alike refuse to
69. Part of the dominance was probably attributable to a press tendency to grant
government sources greater attention and legitimacy than nongovernmental consumer or
environmental sources. Stephen Lacy & David C. Coulson, Comparative Case Study:
Newspaper Source Use on the Environmental Beat, 21 NEWSPAPER RES. J. 1, 14-18 (2000).
70. See SHULER, supra note 16.
71. Id. at 45 (quoting Sam Venable on being silenced by Knoxville News-Sentinel,
(and re-confirmed to author by Venable in July 2012)). Carson Brewer, a respected veteran
eastern Tennessee journalist, ceased writing skeptical articles about Tellico when TVA hired
him to write its official history, as did freelancer Jim Dykes, regretfully, when he likewise
joined TVA's payroll. WHEELER & McDONALD, supra note 3, at 141- 42.
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authorize investigative reporting on Tellico Dam, the region's biggest
controversy. A young reporter from the Lenoir City paper came up to the
darter defenders after they had presented the full case against the dam at a
local Rotary Club meeting, including data showing that the dam violated
safety standards, imperiling portions of Lenoir City. Would he report the
flood threat story and the economic case against the dam? The answer was,
neither. "I know you're right about this Tellico Dam," the young reporter
said, "but my publisher won't let me write a story that raises any doubts
about it."
There may have been another more human reality behind the Tennessee
media's deficiencies in reporting the case, notably after the dramatic God
Committee verdict. For reporters and their editors in Tennessee (and for
national media as well), there may have been a visceral instinctive
resistance to changing the previous conceptions about the Tellico Project
and the snail darter. Once the story is framed in the mind,72 nurtured by
TVA's dominant media flow-a trivial fish versus a valuable hydro dam,
with extremist outsiders whining about the region's most eminent
governmental agency-it was understandably difficult to turn perceptions
inside out. The same syndrome could easily apply to the media's audience
as well. Over the six years, in probably thousands of daily conversations
and talk radio phone-ins, people had expressed their belittling amusement
or disgust with the silly minnow and the environmentalists who were using
it to block progress. It's as hard for reporters as it is for regular citizens to
change their minds on something they've accepted as a truism, and even
harder if it means not only that they were wrong but that, further, they've
been gulled, played for fools, swallowed lies aimed at the minds of a
population lacking the sophistication to perceive a con job.73
72. See George Lakoff, Simple Framing: An Introduction to Framing and Its Use in
Politics, ROCKRIDGE INST., http://www.rockridgeinstitute.org/projects/strategic/simple_
framing / (last visited Apr. 23, 2006); see also GEORGE LAKOFF, DON'T THINK OF AN
ELEPHANT! KNOW YOUR VALUES AND FRAME THE DEBATE: THE ESSENTIAL GUIDE FOR
PROGRESSIVES (2004). Professor Lakoff studies how the industrial coalition that organized in
the early 1970s with an agenda of building a conservative movement to take power in
national politics consistently employed sophisticated techniques of word-spinning so as to
make regressive policies seem quite progressive or benign. He follows this framing
technique through examples from the current administration's misleading labels for its
regressive policies under monikers such as "Healthy Forests Initiative," "No Child Left
Behind," "Clear Skies Initiative," "Endangered Species Recovery," and "tax relief' efforts.
Id.
73. Studies show that people care less about understanding the complexity and
accuracy of an issue than adhering to their personal emotional reaction. See Joe Keohane,
How Facts Backfire-Researchers Discover a Surprising Threat to Democracy: Our Brains,
BOSTON GLOBE (Jui. 11, 2010), http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/ideas/articles
/2010/07/11/howfactsbackfire/; see also Ingrid S. Spangler & Donnalyn Pompper,
Corporate Social Responsibility and the Oil Industry, 37 PUB. RELATIONS REV. 220 (2011).
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In this context, it's not surprising that local and national public opinion
doesn't easily swing now toward the farmers and the fish or that reporters
and their editors, beyond their tendencies to follow the story line that had
taken hold from the start and parrot TVA, are hesitating to acknowledge to
themselves and their readers that they were patsies, failing to explore the
most basic facts of a major controversy in their backyard.
B. National Media
The national press was as disappointing as Tennessee's in its coverage
of the merits of TVA's Tellico Project. In small part that may have reflected
the national reach of the regional agency's power. Several weeks after
having been guided around the valley by the farmers and Cherokee, Justice
William 0. Douglas prepared an article that National Geographic agreed to
publish, with extensive photographs showing the nation what it would lose
if Tellico Dam was built. When Justice Douglas presented his article to the
National Geographic magazine, Red Wagner and his TVA lobbyists
intervened and Dersuaded the editor-and those of other magazines he
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contacted-that it was too radical. Douglas finally had to publish the piece,
"This Valley Waits to Die," in True, The Man's Magazine, where it was
promoted on the cover alongside a blond starlet wearing a skimpy swimsuit
and carrying a snorkel, a forum hardly befitting the work of a Supreme
Court justice. 74
Where previously the darter's quixotic legal victories had regularly
been featured, with ironic photos, on the front pages of the nation's
newspapers, or as a lead story or final story on the nightly news, this latest
and most upbeat chapter of the darter story is downplayed. The New York
Times had posted the darter's quixotic Supreme Court victory on A1, but
the God Committee verdict had been covered only briefly, back on page
twenty-two. The revelations of skewed pork barrel economics were hardly
mentioned. Charles Mohr of the Times, recently assigned to the Washington
environmental beat after superb war reporting from Saigon, listened to us,
examined the maps showing vast acreages taken for resale, and was clearly
interested, but ultimately told us, "I don't see a workable hook for the
Times. These new facts completely change the story that people have been
hearing, but it's too difficult, saying to our readers that now they've got to
understand a whole new version." The Post put the God Committee's
economic verdict on page twelve. The Wall Street Journal, which had
railed so raucously against species litigation and called for sober economic
analyses to resolve such controversies, put it on page eighteen. The God
Committee story did not make most radio and TV shows. It was sent out on
the Associated Press wire service, but many newspapers and local stations
chose not to run it, and those that did completely failed to mention the
economics.
C. Locally, Regionally, Nationally: What's News?
How does the Press decide what to cover in newspapers and broadcasts,
and how deeply? As two journalism professors noted, "The short answer is:
nobody really knows. The 'standard' answer seems to be 'Whatever they
[or their editor] think their reader/viewer will be interested in.' ' 75 Most
news departments use some version of a common list of factors:
* Conflict;
• Impact;
74. WHEELER & McDoNALD, supra note 3, at, 84-85; William 0. Douglas, This
Valley Waits to Die, TRUE, THE MAN'S MAGAZINE (May 1969), at 40-43, 91-98.
75. E-mails from Barbara Croll Fought & Patricia H. Longstaff, Professors, Syracuse
University S.I. Newhouse School of Public Communications, to David E. Cole, the author's
research assistant, Boston College Law School (Jul. 25, 2001) (on file with author). "The
cynical answer is [that reporters report] whatever they can get easily (without a lot of




* Interest (of audience);
" Novelty;
" Prominence (people, institutions, etc.);
" Proximity; and
* Timeliness. 6
Note that the snail darter story at various times in those years would
seem to have engaged all these attractor-stimulator factors likely to pull in
readers and viewers, and would also serve a socially important public-
information function. The puzzle is why it did not do so.
In a study of press sensationalism that focused on the Tellico Dam case,
the authors were deeply critical of how the story was consistently trivialized
in the New York Times (and in the Knoxville papers as well):
The press can be neither condemned nor absolved of responsibility for
the sensationalism that existed in the articles .... It seems that the more
unique an issue, the more likely it will be treated in a sensational fashion..
. . An event for the press must have inherent news value-a "quickening
urgency" befitting newsroom codes . . . . Since news space is limited,
[editors] decide what is "newsworthy" and what is "extraneous" in
headlines, leads, and major parts of news articles. Given such
organizational constraints, one can better understand why the snail darter
[itself] captured the attention of both the local and national press, and why
the less "newsy" long-term issues, such as the dam's impact on the
economy, environment, and culture, did not.77
In several instances with national reporters, the Tennesseans found a
bemusing contradiction: although a common instinctive journalistic desire
was to "scoop" the competition, many expressed reluctance to get too far
out in front on a progressive issue-ironically, if someone else had
previously published on the issue they'd feel more secure. In other cases it
appeared to be a reluctance to focus on negative revelations about
establishment entities for fear of being castigated as "too liberal," although
some were pleased to paraphrase or just print official press releases.
The complexity of the Tellico Project facts may in part explain the
press's diffidence. It was too complex to be summarized in a three-second
quip or a twenty-second sound bite, forcing reporters or the darters'
advocates into unsuccessful attempts to distill a comprehensive analysis to a
superficial summary or risk a glazed-over look from an editor or producer
conveying the message that "our audience will never understand that."
One unfortunate element may be the media's general impression that
the American media audience is unsophisticated scientifically and
76. Id.
77. Carroll J. Glynn & Albert R. Tims, Environmental and Natural Resource Issues:
Press Sensationalism, TRANSACTIONS OF THE 45TH NORTH AMERICAN WILDLIFE AND
NATURAL RESOURCES CONFERENCE 99, 109 (1980).
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politically, and uninterested in complex issues of societal governance.78 In
the current stressful context of modem publishing, media news divisions
today are expected to be revenue-generating entities, no longer supported as
a media corporation's civic responsibility. The diluted result is
"infotainment," a breezy "news product" shaped by the need to build the
largest possible potential audience. The news that is covered is not shaped
by the significance of facts that a civil society needs to process publicly, a
deficit exasperated by the pressure of selling ads.79 Gauging potential media
audience numbers is a process of marketing analysis. The news business
today is a business, and its marketing logic typically often pegs the product
at the level and format deemed likely to attract the largest block of
American consumers. The perception, it seems, is not necessarily that the
American media audience and voters are stupid so much as ignorant, in the
sense of uninformed and unknowing. 80
78. The ignorance of Americans about processes and issues in domestic and
international politics is evident in many public polls. For example, a Harris poll conducted
for the American Bar Association released in December 2005, revealed that only 55% of the
American public could correctly identify the three branches of government; 22% named the
branches Democrat, Republican, and Independent, and 16% named them local, state, and
federal. See Harris Poll Reveals Governmental Knowledge of Many Americans, DAILY
RECORD (Dec. 13, 2005). Additionally, 29% of the public answered that the role of the
judiciary is to advise the President and Congress on the legality of future actions.
79. "Local journalistic institutions that have traditionally served democracy by
promoting values of openness, accountability, and public engagement are themselves in
crisis from financial, technological, and behavioral changes taking place in our society."
Knight Commission Report, supra note 11, at xii. News that hurts potential ads can undercut
the financial position of the media entity. Upholding the status quo, not rocking the boat, is
generally the most profitable avenue for news owners, given the industry's reliance on
corporate advertising. See J. HERBERT ALTSCHULL, AGENTS OF POWER: THE MEDIA AND
PUBLIC POLICY 107, 397-98 (2d ed. 1995).
80. Twenty years ago, many or most electronic media news departments and
newspapers operated with a professional sense of responsibility as the public's source of
information, despite the substantial cost of maintaining reporters around the world. In 1986,
NBC's News cost the network as much as $100 million a year. See Marc Gunther, The
Transformation of Network News, Nieman Reports (Special Issue), Summer 1999, at 20, 21;
see also Sarah Sun Beale, The News Media's Influence on Criminal Justice Policy: How
Market-Driven News Promoted the Punitiveness Revolution (Jan. 2005) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with BOSTON COLLEGE ENTVL. AFF. L. REV.). The financial burdens were
treated as the price of enjoying bandwidth monopolies on the airwaves and recompense for
the privilege of operating national networks. Since the early 1980s, however, the traditional
news audience has declined precipitously, and network and newspaper consolidation has led
to large-scale corporations that expect revenue production from all divisions, and pressures
for generating profits. General Electric bought NBC, Capital Cities Communications bought
ABC, and Laurence Tisch, a hotel and theater entrepreneur, took over CBS. Subsequently
Disney bought ABC and Viacom took over CBS. For a review of these moves and their
consequences, see JAMES T. HAMILTON, ALL THE NEWS THAT'S FIT TO SELL: HOW THE
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The perception of the American audience as uninformed and
indiscriminate regarding issues of social policy and governance is
unfortunately furthered by the way that American journalists are generally
coached in how to present the news. The Fogg Index is an elaborate method
by which the text of journalistic stories is scaled in terms of relative
education levels s.8 According to several reporters, most American media
target the level of their discourse at a Fogg Index of an eighth-grade reading
level or lower. Only a few national newspapers target their text at a Fogg
Index level of high school graduate or higher.8 2 It is true that the complexity
or reading level of a text's syntax does not necessarily equate with the
reader's level of reasoning or analytical and logical ability, but observation
of mass media suggests that a convincing case can be made that the
material being transmitted is as low in brainpower as it is in syntax.
And there is the public information dominance of established interests.
Any analysis of how the media performs its information function must also
take into account the societal realities of the national context in which they
operate. In an era of massive industry-funded denial of human-caused
climate change and the Supreme Court's Citizens United majority decision,
MARKET TRANSFORMS INFORMATION INTO NEWS 160-89 (2004). The corps of reporters-
especially expensive foreign-posted reporters-has been cut back substantially, and news
formats are now dominated by less expensive "infotainment," "soft" features, with shrunken
commitments to actual news reporting. See Beale, supra at 20.
81. The Fogg Index represents the level of writing for a particular educational grade.
Follow the steps below to calculate the Fogg Index of your content:
1. Select a sample of at least 100 words.
2. Compute the average number of words per sentence:
a. Divide the number of sentences into the total number of words in the sample.
3. Compute the percentage of words with 3 or more syllables (Exclude words where the
polysyllable is created by -ed or -ing. Exclude proper nouns.)
a. Divide the number of words into the number of polysyllables.
4. Add the average number of words per sentence (2a) to the percent of polysyllables (3 a).
5. Multiply the sum by 0.4 and round off to the nearest tenth.
This is your Fogg Index.
ROBERT GUNNING, THE TECHNIQUE OF CLEAR WRITING (1952), as presented in Univ. of
Virginia, Best Practice Briefs (Jun. 2005) at 4, available at http://www.virginia.edu
/provost/public/pdf/writingreports.pdf.
82. Consider the issue of global warming in the American media. A FoxNews.com
climate change story rated a 29, making it understandable to someone between eleventh and
twelfth grade. See Robert Roy Britt, 2005 Ties for 2nd Warmest Year Ever, but Cause Still
Uncertain, Fox NEWS (Jan. 9, 2006), http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,180896,00
.html. A CNN.com story scored a 32, making it understandable to a high school graduate.
See 2005 Was Australia's Hottest Yet, CNN (Jan. 4, 2006), information available at
http://www.bom.gov.au/announcements /mediareleases/nt/20060104year.shtml. A New
York Times story scored a 35, making it understandable to someone who spent two years in
college. See Nicholas D. Kristof, A Paradise Drowning, NEW YORK TIMES (Jan. 8, 2006), at
Al5. Calculations for each story were based on a test of the first 300 words of each article.
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it is notable how powerful establishment interests dominate the political and
83informational networks that shape our society's governance.
On its facts, complex though they were, the snail darter-Tellico Dam
story was brimming with legal, political, economic, even philosophical
import. It could have shaped a long-running news cycle with successive
stories on all the intriguing features of the saga-Indians, farmers, agency
pork, corrupt officials, junk science, fraudulent economics, David revealing
Goliath to be a midget, the important implications for other federally-
subsidized boondoggles, an affirmation of American pluralist democracy as
local citizens with no political power carried an issue to the highest levels
in the land, the unique Committee of God .... But it did not happen. As far
as the American public was concerned, the silly little fish story remained an
unchanged caricature.
D. What More Could the Citizens Have Done to Push the Media to Look
Into the Facts?
Throughout the snail darter-Tellico Dam history, the Tennessee citizens
kept asking themselves what more could be done to prompt the media to
look into the dramatic facts of the case. The author's neighbor in Ann
Arbor, Michigan, Charles Eisendrath, a professor of environmental
journalism, had been a Newsweek reporter. "You've got to start a news
climate rolling," he told us. "The articles you've been getting just aren't
doing it. The story needs to have legs, you need to find hooks for a
continuing series of articles digging into the case!"
Hooks and legs, but how? Naming the case "Tellico Farmers v. TVA"
might well have done it, but that option was in the past. The group
considered a variety of innovative gimmicks to hook in press attention. Get
celebrities to speak on the project's flaws and the river's economic
potential? Unsuccessful efforts were made to reach Chip Carter, the
President's son, for a float trip on the river; Robert Redford, who had
exhibited an environmental consciousness; Dolly Parton, who grew up
farther up Highway 411 that crossed the river. How about painting the
concrete structure of the dam with big pink letters?-"$4 million Turkey,"
and getting a photograph on the AP wire before TVA could erase the paint,
inviting a story that the dam was small and most of the project's vaunted
$100+ million budget was for condemning farmland for resale, plus useful
new roads and bridges that served river-based alternatives. The citizens
never pulled that off nor an elaborate road show demonstrating what the
valley could look like with tourism, farming, river-based recreation, plus an
83. See Chris Mooney, As the World Burns, Some Like It Hot, MOTHER JONES
MAGAZINE, (May-June 2005) (analyzing millions of dollars being spent by oil companies to
support climate denial); Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
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industrial park and residential areas, that proved logistically too much for
the exhausted group.
One evening, the author called former Washington Post ombudsman,
Ben Bagdikian, then teaching at Berkeley. Reporters all over the country
revered Bagdikian as the conscience of the journalistic profession. But,
"I'm sorry," he said wearily. "I can't tell you how to reverse the way your
story is getting covered. This is an era of industrial arrogance. There's a
strong tide running against environmentalism in the press and in politics."
The most Bagdikian could suggest was that "Maybe you could persuade
Ruder & Finn to take on your case." Ruder & Finn was a press relations
firm volunteering a measure of public interest public relations work. The
Ruder & Finn contact, when told the essential facts of the case, expressed
strong interest in taking it on pro bono but noted that the firm would need a
check from the Tennesseans for $20,000, "to cover expenses." If that kind
of funding was what is needed to bring significant public information into
the media and political processes, the implications for democracy weren't
promising.
E. Would the Internet Have Solved It? A Public Interest Information
Archive in Cyberspace?
If it had then existed, would the miracle of the Internet have offered a
solution to the darter group's problem of building informed public
perceptions? Today's blogosphere has extraordinary ability to transmit
revelations in text and images virally around the globe in nanoseconds. The
Internet offers the most powerful and sophisticated knowledge transfer
mechanism in human history. Unfortunately, however, the information
transfer functions of the Internet are chaotic. There is no mechanism for
verifying the accuracy of facts and analysis other than the volunteered
efforts of engaged participants, which takes constant attention and
individual effort on an ever-changing topography, and the market forces
that so often skew public information toward narrowed special interests
have the incentive and ability to intrude and maintain their version of reality
in the Internet realm.
Here is a hypothesis for how today the facts of a darter-dam
controversy could be accurately conveyed through the hyper-capabilities of
modem communication technology. Take for example the congressional
pork barrel's reaction to Secretary Andrus's letter. The pork barrel insiders
knew that they could operate without regard to the public merits because
the public did not know the merits. If every member of Congress who stood
to make a speech against the ESA and the snail darter-about how the
darter was destroying the economic future of its locality, blocking a huge
hydroelectric dam, or the Act stopping thousands of economic projects
across the nation-knew that reporters could go to one comprehensive
public interest information website where their allegations would be laid
out and contradicted by the facts, then the debate would tend to move closer
20131
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to the truth. Such a website could contain a compendium of different
environmental issue sectors, each with summaries of the opposing
assertions and authoritative presentations of the public interest case, charts,
maps, data, sound bites, lists of published sources and experts available to
respond to reporters' queries, online photographs and B-roll video footage.
Reporters themselves would be straightened up by the knowledge that if
they wrote stories that ignored information readily available in one
consistent authoritative location, they would be caught out as incompetent.
Such an experiment should be worth trying for civic-minded foundations
willing to risk a couple million dollars in a high-aspiration venture that
could change the nature of public policy discourse in modem democratic
governance.
VI. CONCLUSION
Several years after the Little Tennessee River was impounded, as TVA,
confronting the failure of its development plans, held an auction of large
blocks of condemned farmlands. CBS's Dan Rather sent reporter Bernard
Goldberg down to Tennessee to look into the auction. His video report
interviewed Nell McCall, Jean Ritchey, and Beryl Moser, farmers who
were excluded from buying back their lands because the compensation
they'd been given was a small fraction of what the land would yield at
auction. The reporter noted the failure of TVA's economic claims, and the
unsuspected facts of farmlands condemned for resale, not for the reservoir.
As the video report ended, back in the studio in New York, Dan Rather's
voice had a catch in it as he signed off for the night. He continued to sit
grimly at the news desk as the closing credits rolled. When the "Live-On-
Air" light finally winked off, he jerked around in his chair and barked at
Kathy Moore, the producer who had prepared the retrospective on the
Tennessee endangered species controversy. "Goddammit!," Rather yelled.
"We missed the fucking story! How in hell, over all those years, did we miss
the whole fucking story?!" "Rather had tears in his eyes," Moore recounted
to the author. "He was choked up and angry. I didn't have the heart to tell
him that we had filmed the story. Harry Reasoner had done the reporting.
We had it ready in the can for 60 Minutes. I don't know why CBS didn't
run the story," Moore said. "Somehow they could never find the time.
84
The media's role in this classic case reflects an ambiguity in modem
American democracy. In no other country in the world could a small group
of people so lacking in power and influence have challenged a politically
powerful mistake so long and so far through the highest levels and through
84. The author's conversation with CBS Segment Producer Kathy Moore occurred at
lunch in Newton, Massachusetts in the late 1980s when she visited Boston College and had
extended discussions about the Tellico Dam Controversy in retrospect.
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so many branches of national government-and the citizens came very
close to winning. With just one or two additional happenstances-
intelligent media coverage alone would almost surely have done it-the
river could still be flowing today. The farmers would still be farming, the
valley's economy prospering with tourism, agriculture, an active trout-
fishing destination drawing anglers from throughout the Southeastern U.S.,
an industrial park at the river's highway and rail crossing, and residential
clusters along Highway 72-social and entrepreneurial development far
better in economic as well as ecological terms than it is at present. And the
darter would still be darting among its cobblestones beneath the riffles of
the Little Tennessee.

